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“It cannot be helped, it is as it should be, that the law is behind the times.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
Changes in the health care industry and increasing costs of health care create
incentives for hospitals to consider hospital mergers. From 1981 to 1991, as many as
195 hospitals underwent mergers.2 The next decade demonstrated a drastic upsurge
of hospital mergers, from 18 in 1993 to 735 in 1995.3 This rise in mergers may stem
from economic reasons, but also may be attributable to the federal government’s
difficulties in enjoining such mergers under the antitrust laws. This article will
demonstrate that Cleveland Clinic Health System’s (CCHS) recent mergers and
acquisitions have increased market concentration, giving CCHS undue market
control, and triggering serious antitrust concerns justifying further investigation by
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).
A network of not-for-profit hospitals, CCHS provides acute-care health care
services to Northeast Ohio. CCHS claims that its mergers and hospital combinations
create a service for the people of Northeast Ohio with which no other health system
in the area can compete.4 CCHS consists of Euclid Hospital, Fairview Hospital,
Hillcrest Hospital, Huron Hospital, Lakewood Hospital, Lutheran Hospital,
Marymount Hospital, South Pointe Hospital, Cleveland Clinic Children’s Hospital
Rehabilitation, and The Cleveland Clinic.5 Also affiliated with CCHS are Ashtabula
County Medical Center and Grace Hospital.6 These hospital affiliates take part in
numerous programs provided by CCHS, but have not yet been legally merged into
CCHS.7
This article analyzes the implications of the Clayton Antitrust Act8 (Clayton Act)
and the Sherman Antitrust Act9 (Sherman Act) as they pertain to the CCHS. Part
One provides background analysis of these two statutes, and the application of those
statutes to mergers in the health care industry. Part Two discusses the elements
needed to prove the government’s prima facie case. This consists of a discussion of
a relevant market, which includes the product and geographic markets. This section
also contains a description and analysis of market concentration, measured by the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). Part Three provides further background
1
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, speech at Harvard Law School Association of New York,
New York City, February 15, 1913. Speeches by Oliver Wendell Holmes 101 (1934).
2

Donna A. Alexander, UPMC Mergers Under Antitrust Law: An Analysis of the
Application of the Federal Antitrust Laws to Non-Profit Hospital Mergers, 38 DUQ. L. REV.
77 (1999).
3

Id.

4

Id.

5

Id.

6

Id.

7

Alexander, supra note 2, at 77.

8

Clayton Act §§ 1-14, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-25 (2002).

9

Sherman Act §§ 1-7, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2002).
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information on the CCHS hospital affiliates, and discusses CCHS’ recent acquisition
activities. Part Four analyzes whether these recent activities amount to a violation of
antitrust laws, warranting further investigation by the FTC. This section also
provides a description and analysis of two possible defenses that CCHS may raise.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE RELEVANT ANTITRUST LAWS
Antitrust laws, in general, help to maintain a competitive market, and in
turn protect the consumer from unwarranted price increases.10 The Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) are the federal agencies
charged with enforcing the Clayton Act11 and the Sherman Act.12 These two statutes
preserve competition and protect consumers from unfair price increases.13 Similarly,
the antitrust laws afford protection to existing competitors as well as potential
competitors attempting to enter the market.14

10

Alexander, supra note 2, at 79.

11

Clayton Act §§ 1-14, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-25 (2001). Section 18 of the Clayton Act states in
relevant part: “No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall
acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no
person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or
any part of the assets of another person engaged also in commerce or in any activity affecting
commerce, where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any
section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly. No person shall acquire, directly or indirectly,
the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no person subject to the
jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets
of one or more persons engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where in
any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the
effect of such acquisition, of such stocks or assets, or of the use of such stock by the voting or
granting of proxies or otherwise, may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to
create a monopoly.” Id.
12

Sherman Act §§ 1-7, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7. The Sherman Act states in relevant part: “Every
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.
Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby
declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be
punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person,
$350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the
discretion of the court…
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction
thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other
person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments,
in the discretion of the court.” Id.
13
Kenneth E. Yeadon, Allowing Large Hospitals to Merge: United States v. Long Island
Jewish Medical Center, 3 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 79, 79-80 (1999).
14
First Delaware Valley Citizens Television, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 925, 930
(E.D. Pa. 1975).
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A. The Sherman Act
In 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Act, the first federal antitrust statute
enacted in the United States.15 Its purpose is to prevent competitors from creating
monopolies through mergers, thus driving up prices.16 The framers of the Sherman
Act did not intend to restrain competent business decisions of any given company or
individual, absent the intent to monopolize.17 The Sherman Act allows for a great
deal of freedom to contract or otherwise, absent the intent to monopolize, but
collaborative action through combinations and mergers raises a different problem.
The Act prohibits such action when it tends to lessen or destroy competition in any
given market, to which the consumer has sought protection.18 This gives companies
the ability to exercise business judgment without being concerned about potential
violations of the antitrust laws. As long as these decisions are not for the purpose of
monopolizing then the company in question is exempt from prosecution under the
Sherman Act.19 In 1890, Congress intended to use the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution to its full potential to have it reach the substantive
prohibitions of the Sherman Act, thus creating a competitive business market under
the fullest use of Congressional power permitted by the Constitution to regulate
interstate and foreign commerce.20
The Sherman Act embraces a distinct economic theory, i.e., that uninhibited
competition better regulates prices and production than even the most enlightened
merger.21 Nevertheless, the Sherman Act does not apply to monopolies in and of
themselves.22 The Sherman Act’s purpose is to restrict and restrain activities and
combinations that inhibit or affect interstate commerce.23

15

Alexander, supra note 2, at 79.

16

Id.

17

Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass’n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
“[T]rade associations or combinations of persons or corporations which openly and
fairly gather and disseminate information as to the cost of their product, … the actual
price which the product has brought in past transactions, stocks of merchandise on
hand, approximate cost of transportation from the principal point of shipment to the
points of consumption, as did these defendants, and who, as they did, meet and discuss
such information and statistics without however reaching or attempting to reach any
agreement or any concerted action with respect to prices or production or restraining
competition, do not thereby engage in unlawful restraint of commerce.” Id. at 586.
18

Id. at 578.

19

See Id.

20

Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 487 F.2d 373, 376 (9th Cir. 1973) (citing U.S. v. SouthEastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 558-59; 88 L. Ed. 1440, 64 S. Ct. 1162 (1944)).
21

United States v. Nat’l Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y.1945).

22

Bigelow v. Calumet & Hecla Mining Co., 167 F. 721 (6th Cir. 1909).

23

Id.
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The Sherman Act will not be used to prevent normal growth of any particular
business; the size of a company itself is not a violation of the Act.24 As long as a
company gains expanse through lawful means, and violates no other law to
perpetuate company growth, the company will not trigger the Sherman Act.25 The
Act however does not necessarily look to the form or the means of the merger, but
looks at the intended results to be achieved by such merger.26 It is irrelevant whether
the means used to achieve the illegal end are themselves legal or illegal.27 If the
company’s means perpetuate a conspiracy to eliminate competition, then such
activity is within the scope of what the Act prohibits.28
Sherman Act decisions are highly fact specific.29 Courts closely analyze the facts
of each case because the Sherman Act does not provide any definitions for its
terms.30 Despite the absence of these definitions, congressional intent analysis
indicates that the terms “contract,” “combination,” or “conspiracy in restraint of
trade or commerce,” may be interpreted and given the same meaning attributed to
these words through common law.31 In applying this rule to potential antitrust cases,
district courts and circuit courts often hold that each case arising under the Act must
be resolved based on the facts presented in the record of each case.32 Therefore, each
new case that arises must be factually distinguished from any prior case being
examined as precedent.33 Consequently, cases arising under the Sherman Act will be
relatively difficult to prove, as precedent will be limited. With each case primarily
fact driven, it will be difficult, although not impossible, to locate cases on point.
Although the Sherman Act seeks to protect a competitive market, its role is not a
cure-all for all wrongs committed in the marketplace.34 A literal approach to section
one of the Sherman Act would prohibit every contact, combination, or conspiracy
that restrained trade.35 If courts used this standard, section one would prohibit nearly
24

United States v. N.Y. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626, 642 (E.D. Ill. 1946)
(citations omitted).
25

Id.

26

First Delaware Valley Citizens Television, Inc. v. CBS, Inc. and WHP, Inc., 398 F.
Supp. 925, 928 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (citing American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781,
809 (1946)).
27

Id.

28

Id.

29

United States v. Parker-Rust-Proof Co., 61 F. Supp. 805 (E.D. Mich. 1945).

30
Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass’n, 268 U.S. 563 (1925). See also Appalachian Coals, Inc. v.
United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933), overruled on other grounds by Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984); Sugar Institute, Inc., v. U.S., 297 U.S. 553
(1936).
31

Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).

32

Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass’n, 268 U.S. at 579.

33

Id.

34

Sitkin Smelting & Refining Co. v. FMC Corp., 575 F.2d 440, 448 (3rd Cir. 1978).

35

Id. at 446 (citing Northern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356 US 1, 5 (1958)).
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every contract or combination concerning trade, because in some sense every
agreement or merger concerning trade will in some way restrain trade.36 Therefore,
courts interpret this section of the Sherman Act to prohibit only those contracts or
combinations that unreasonably restrain competition.37
1. Discussion of the Rule of Reason
The United States Supreme Court held in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc.,38 that the most widely used standard in the application of the Sherman Act is the
rule of reason.39 Under the requirements of the rule of reason the finder of fact must
consider all of the circumstances surrounding an activity to determine whether such
activity should be prohibited as an unreasonable restraint on trade.40 Certain
situations that arise however, will be considered violative of the Sherman Act absent
any contemplation of the situation’s reasonableness.41 Using the rule of reason in
every case would be time consuming and expensive, thus expenses have been saved
and time spent on litigation reduced by the recognition of per se rules.42
Before 1975, courts generally held that members of the medical profession and
other “learned professions” were exempt from antitrust laws.43 The exemption
stemmed from the Supreme Court view that involvement in “learned professions”
was not interstate in nature, and therefore did not fall within the scope of the
Sherman Act.44 The Supreme Court restricted this exemption in the case of
American Medical Association v. United States.45 In that case, the Court considered
whether the medical profession participated in “trade” or “commerce” within the
scope of the Sherman Act.46 But, the Court refused to answer the question, stating
“the calling or occupation of the individual physicians charged as defendants is
immaterial if the purpose and effect of their conspiracy was . . . obstruction and
restraint of the business of Group Health.”47 The court will no longer concentrate on
the status of the person participating in the prohibited conduct, but will focus instead
on the status of the target of such restraint. By recognizing this shift in focus, the
Court established the possibility that federal antitrust laws could apply to the learned

36

Id.

37

Id.

38

Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).

39

Id.

40

Id.

41

Id.

42

Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982).

43

MATTHEW BENDER, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 70.01 (2d ed. 2001).

44

Id.

45

Id.

46

American Medical Association v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 528 (1943).

47

Id.
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professions.48 It was not until the 1975 landmark case Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar49 that the Court eliminated the “learned professions” exemption to antitrust
laws.50 Today, it is well understood that the activities of “learned professions”
represent an important part of interstate commerce, and that anticompetitive
activities by these professionals may constitute unreasonable restraint on
commerce.51
2. Application of the Per Se Rule
The Sherman Act’s per se rule applies to many industries. This design creates a
rebuttable presumption that the health care industry will also be within the scope of
the Sherman Act. In the past, the Supreme Court demonstrated some reluctance in
applying the per se rule to activities in the health care industry. The Court though
has also made it clear that this industry is not exempt from the application of this
rule.52 In Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Co.,53 the Supreme Court applied the
per se rule, disallowing price-fixing by physicians, stating “[i]n unequivocal terms…,
‘[whatever] may be its peculiar problems and characteristics, the Sherman Act, so far
as price-fixing agreements are concerned, establishes one uniform rule applicable to
all industries alike.’”54 Before the case reached the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals refused to apply the per se rule reasoning that the health care
market was far removed from the competitive model.55 Lower federal courts remain
reluctant to apply the per se rule to the health care industry.56
B. The Clayton Act
Due to the rigid and narrow interpretation of the Sherman Act by the Supreme
Court that made it difficult for the government to prove an antitrust violation,
Congress passed the Clayton Act in 1914.57 Following its passage, Congress made
numerous amendments to the Clayton Act, the most drastic being the revision of
48

BENDER, supra note 43.

49

421 U.S. 773 (1975).

50

Id.

51

Id. at 788.

52

Id.

53

457 U.S. 332 at 349 (citations omitted).

54

Id.

55

Id. at 349-350.

56

See generally Medical Arts Pharmacy, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 518 F.
Supp. 1100, 1107 (D. Conn. 1981), aff’d, 675 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1982); Oksanen v. Page
Memorial Hosp., 945 F.2d 696, 708 (4th Cir. 1991); Kiepfer v. Beller, 944 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir.
1991); U.S. v. Alston, 974 F.2d 1206, 1214 (9th Cir. 1992); Betkerur v. Aultman Hosp. Ass’n,
78 F.3d 1079, 1093 (6th Cir. 1996); Retina Associates, P.A. v. Southern Baptist Hosp., 105
F.3d 1376, 1381-82, reh’g denied, 113 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 1997); Pontius v. Children’s
Hosp., 552 F. Supp. 1352, 1369 (W.D. Pa. 1982).
57

Alexander, supra note 2, at 79.
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December 29, 1950, which reworded the first five paragraphs of the original Clayton
Act.58 Congress made subsequent amendments in 1980, 1984, 1995, and 1996, but
none of these amendments were as extensive as the changes made in 1950.59

58
15 U.S.C. § 18 (2001). The 1950 amendments of December 29, 1950, substituted the
first five paragraphs for ones that read:
“That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital of another corporation engaged
also in commerce, where the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen
competition between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and the corporation
making the acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in any section or community, or
tend to create a monopoly of any line of commerce.”

“No corporation shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock
or other share capital of two or more corporations engaged in commerce where the
effect of such acquisition, or the use of such stock by the voting or granting of proxies
or otherwise, may be to substantially lessen competition between such corporations, or
any of them, whose stock or other share capital is so acquired, or to restrain such
commerce in any section or community, or tend to create a monopoly of any line of
commerce.”
“This section shall not apply to corporations purchasing such stock solely for
investment and not using the same by voting or otherwise to bring about, or in
attempting to bring about, the substantial lessening of competition. Nor shall anything
contained in this section prevent a corporation engaged in commerce from causing the
formation of subsidiary corporations for the actual carrying on of their immediate
lawful business, or the natural and legitimate branches or extensions thereof, or from
owning and holding all or a part of the stock of such subsidiary corporations, when the
effect of such formation is not to substantially lessen competition.”
“Nor shall anything herein contained be construed to prohibit any common carrier
subject to the laws to regulate commerce from aiding in the construction of branches
or short lines so located as to become feeders to the main line of the company so
aiding in such construction or from acquiring or owning all or any part of the stock of
such branch lines, nor to prevent any such common carrier from acquiring and owning
all or any part of the stock of a branch or short line constructed by an independent
company where there is no substantial competition between the company owning the
branch line so constructed and the company owning the main line acquiring the
property or an interest therein, nor to prevent such common carrier from extending any
of its lines through the medium of the acquisition of stock or otherwise of any other
such common carrier where there is no substantial competition between the company
extending its lines and the company whose stock, property, or an interest therein is so
acquired.”
“Nothing contained in this section shall be held to affect or impair any right heretofore
legally acquired: provided, that nothing in this section shall be held or construed to
authorize or make lawful anything heretofore prohibited or made illegal by the
antitrust laws, nor to exempt any person from the penal provisions thereof or the civil
remedies therein provided.” Id.
59

Id. See infra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
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1. Discussion of Seminal Antitrust Case: Brown Shoe Co. v. United States
The seminal Brown Shoe Co. v. United States60 decision interprets the 1950
changes to the Clayton Act. The original 1914 text of the Clayton Act disallowed
the acquisition of stock of one corporation by another corporation, when the
acquisition would create a substantial lessening of competition between the two
companies or would tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.61 The
original text of the Clayton Act did not prohibit the acquisition of the assets of one
corporation by another corporation.62 Similarly, the original Clayton Act did not
prohibit the acquisition of stock in one company by any other company other than a
direct competitor.63
Early interpreters of the Clayton Act believed that the drafters of the original text
of the Act overlooked the fact that an asset acquisition may result in just as
substantial a lessening of competition as a stock acquisition. A close inspection of
the legislative history establishes that this belief lacks merit.64 On the contrary,
during the debates over the Clayton Act, legislators discussed asset acquisitions, but
deemed them unimportant, as the purpose was to prevent the development of holding
companies and acquisitions of competitors through the purchases of their stock.65
After the Clayton Act passage in 1914, it was not long before the FTC found
problems with the language and limits of the Act, most specifically in section
seven.66 Initially the FTC wanted to address two issues: first, plugging the loophole
that allowed for an exemption of asset acquisitions under the Act; second, requiring
companies to give notification of proposed mergers to the FTC before
consummation.67 Congress held numerous hearings on both of these proposals.
Neither proposal ever reached the floor of Congress however, until the adoption of
the amendments in 1950.68 The legislative history indicates that the original scope of
the proposed amendment of 1950 to section seven was only to reach asset and stock
acquisitions and their potential threat to competition, but once the proposal reached
the floor of Congress, a number of hearings conducted by both the Eightieth and
Eighty-first Congresses provided a broader scope for the soon-to-be amended section
seven.69
Prior to the 1950 amendments of the Clayton Act, the FTC and Congress had
great difficulty interpreting the language of section seven of the Act. Between the
60

370 U.S. 294 (1962).

61

Id. at 313.

62

Id.

63

Id.

64

Id.

65

Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 313-14.

66

Id. at 314; see also 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2001).

67

Id.

68

Id.

69

Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 314-15.
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years of 1943 and 1949, legislators introduced as many as sixteen bills to amend
section seven of the Clayton Act to Congress for their consideration. In three
separate sessions, and in full public hearings, Congress discussed issues regarding
these proposed amendments.70 Even with a close inspection of the legislative history
concerning the 1950 amendments, the congressional standards intended for the FTC
and the courts to use to determine whether a proposed merger was legal remain
elusive.71 Although section seven of the Clayton Act, as amended in 1950, does not
explicitly state the standards needed for a proper and fair adjudication of the legality
of a proposed merger, the House and Senate reports provided sufficient information.
The transcripts from the floor debates further provided proper guidance for the FTC,
as well as for the courts when reviewing proposed mergers and acquisitions.72 The
1950 amendments, combined with the interpretation of the House and Senate
Reports, substantially alleviated the problems from the original 1914 Clayton Act
and the difficulty with enforcing the Sherman Act.
In Brown Shoe Co., one of the first United States Supreme Court cases
subsequent to the 1950 amendments, the government based its complaint on
accusations that the defendant had been in violation of section seven of the Clayton
Act.73 Initially, the FTC filed a claim asserting that the possible merger between the
defendant shoe companies, by way of a stock exchange, violated section seven of the
Clayton Act.74 The complaint requested injunctive relief to prevent achievement of
the merger.75 At trial, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri held that the proposed merger of the two companies violated section seven
of the Clayton Act as amended in 1950, and granted the FTC’s injunction denying
the merger.76 The United States Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s
decision, holding that the merger would be likely to considerably reduce competition
in the retail sale of men's, women's, and children's shoes, specifically in a large
majority of cities and their surrounding areas where both defendants did business.77
The defendant’s failure to prove that the company proposed the merger to prevent
the loss of resources due to a failing firm, or that the proposed merger would make it
possible for smaller competitors to enter the market, triggered the court’s decision.78

70

Id.

71

Id. at 315.

72

Id.

73

See Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 311-12

74

See generally Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. 294 (1962).

75

Id.

76

Id.

77

Id.

78

Id.
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2. Eight Factors Established by Brown Shoe Co. v. United States
The purpose of the 1950 amendments was to make all types of mergers (vertical
and horizontal), acquisitions, and conglomerations subject to the Clayton Act.79 In
Brown Shoe, the Court established an eight-factor test for determining the validity of
a proposed merger under the Clayton Act.80 First, Congress made both asset sales
and stock acquisitions subject to the Act.81 Second, Congress deleted the language
“acquiring-acquired,” with the purpose of making it easier to have section seven
apply not only to horizontal mergers but also to vertical and conglomerate mergers.
If not prohibited, these mergers could result in the lessening of competition in a line
of commerce in a section of the country.82 Third, Congress sought to afford power to
the FTC and courts to prevent such mergers and acquisitions resulting in undue
concentration from occurring before potential harm could reach the consumer.83
Fourth, Congress intended to apply the Sherman Act standards to section seven
of the Clayton Act as well.84 This move helped to establish the understanding that
the Clayton Act and the Sherman Act compliment each other and should be read
together. Although the standards used to prove a case are now the same, it will be
easier for the government to make a case under the Clayton Act, as the language of
the statute can be and has been interpreted more broadly.
Fifth, Congress was concerned with competition, not competitors, therefore it
was not Congress’ intent to prevent mergers of two small competitors or a viable
company merging with a failing company, so that those competitors may still
compete in the market. Congress instead intended to prevent the type of
combinations that would substantially lesson competition in a section of the
country.85 A blanket look at the legislative history illustrates that the concern
Congress has lies with the protection of competition, not the individual competitors,
and it shows that Congress has the aspirations to only restrain mergers and
acquisitions to the extent that these activities will result in the tendency to lessen
competition in any given market.86
Sixth, Congress did not adopt or reject any test for the measurement of either of
the relevant markets (product or geographic).87 Congress also did not define the
word “substantially” in any way, which would have given the courts a means of

79
United States v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours and Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957). See also
Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 294.
80

Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 316.

81

Id.

82

Id. at 317.

83

Id. 317-18.

84

Id. at 318.

85

Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 319-20.

86

Id. at 320 (emphasis original).

87

Id.
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measuring the competitive or anticompetitive effects of a proposed merger.88 It
appears that this was to be left up to the interpretation of the court.
Seventh, although neither the FTC nor the DOJ have established any tests,
quantitative, qualitative, or otherwise, to define whether any activity “substantially”
lessens competition or tends toward a monopoly, Congress has indicated that a
merger or acquisition has to be functionally viewed in the framework of its market.89
This means that the proposed merger or acquisition will be viewed in light of
whether it will take place in a concentrated market, where it had recent activity by a
few controlling companies attempting to dominate the market, or, where there is easy
accessibility to the market by other competitors and suppliers, or finally, where the
company created barriers to prevent the entrance of other competitors.90 All of these
factors will be taken into account when determining whether a merger or acquisition
results in “substantially” lessening competition in an industry.91
Eighth and finally, Congress couched section seven’s words “may be
substantially to lesson competition” in terms of probabilities, not certainties.92
Although Congress did not provide an explicit definition of the term “substantially,”
it did provide direction for the FTC and the courts in gauging the anticompetitive
possibilities of a potential merger. Thus, one purpose of the Clayton Act was to
address potential harm to competition in the market.93
1980 brought an additional and important amendment to the text of the Clayton
Act.94 In the original 1914 version of the Clayton Act, Congress used the word
“corporation” throughout the Act when describing the potential antitrust defendant.95
The use of this word continued though the 1950 amendments of the Act.96 In 1980,
Congress changed the word “corporation(s)” to “person(s),” wherever it appeared in
the Clayton Act, prohibiting anticompetitive acquisitions by a larger group of
entities, because the word “person(s)” may be more broadly defined than the word
“corporation(s).”97 With the 1980 amendment, Congress meant to eliminate the
loophole in section seven of the Clayton Act.98

88

Id. at 321.

89

Id. at 321-22.

90

Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 321-22.

91

Id.

92

Id. at 323 (emphasis original).

93

Id.

94

15 U.S.C. § 18 Ann.

95

See 15 U.S.C. § 18 Ann.

96

Id.

97

In re Adventist Health Sys., No. 9234, 1991 F.T.C. LEXIS 354, at *38 (F.T.C. Aug. 2,
1991) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 18).
98

Id. at *39 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 18a) (citations omitted).
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Two particular features make the 1980 amendment significant.99 First, as with
the amendments of 1950, this amendment expanded the reach of section seven, and it
demonstrates that Congress intends to eventually be able to reach all possible activity
that may have an anticompetitive result. Thus, Congress is allowing only “pure”
asset acquisitions in a select few controlled industries.100 Section eleven of the
Clayton Act, therefore, which discusses jurisdictional issues, should not be
interpreted narrowly in order to exclude certain entities from the jurisdictional reach
of the prosecuting bodies.101 Also, with the insertion of the word “person(s)” instead
of “corporation(s)” in section seven and section eleven of the Clayton Act, courts
may use section eleven of the Clayton Act, as opposed to the FTC Act, to determine
whether the FTC has jurisdiction over a particular issue.102 The FTC benefits from
this change, as section eleven may be, and has been interpreted more broadly than
the FTC Act.103
Second, by changing the language of the statute to read “person” instead of
“corporation,” the amendment made section seven of the Clayton Act more
inclusive. It is now possible for section seven of the act to reach all entities defined
in section one of the Act.104 This amendment also eliminates any prior confusion
between terms in this Act with the terms used in the FTC Act.105
The legislative history of the Clayton Act establishes that the tests for
determining the legality of a merger or acquisition are less stringent than those used

99

Adventist Health Sys., No. 9234, 1991 F.T.C. LEXIS 354, at *39.

100

Id. (citations omitted).

101

Id.

102

Id.

103

Id.

104

Adventist Health Sys., No. 9234, at *39. See also 15 U.S.C. § 21 Ann.
(a) Commission, Board, or Secretary authorized to enforce compliance. Authority to
enforce compliance with sections 2, 3, 7, and 8 of this Act [15 USCS §§ 13, 14, 18,
19] by the persons respectively subject thereto is hereby vested in the Surface
Transportation Board where applicable to common carriers subject to jurisdiction
under subtitle IV of title 49, United States Code [49 USCS §§ 10101 et seq.]; in the
Federal Communications Commission where applicable to common carriers engaged
in wire or radio communication or radio transmission of energy; in the Secretary of
Transportation where applicable to air carriers and foreign air carriers subject to the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 [49 USCS Appx §§ 1301 et seq.]; in the Federal Reserve
Board [Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System] where applicable to banks,
banking associations, and trust companies; and in the Federal Trade Commission
where applicable to all other character of commerce to be exercised as follows:
(b) Issuance of complaints for violations; hearing; intervention; filing of testimony;
report; cease and desist orders; reopening and alteration of reports or orders.
Whenever the Commission, Board, or Secretary vested with jurisdiction thereof shall
have reason to believe that any person is violating or has violated any of the provisions
of sections 2, 3, 7, and 8 of this Act [15 USCS §§ 13, 14, 18, 19]… Id.

105

Id.
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under the Sherman Act.106 Similarly, the Clayton Act only requires a showing of a
potential anticompetitive effect while the Sherman Act requires a showing of actual
restraint.107 Because the test used to decide a case under the Clayton Act differs
slightly from that used for a claim arising under the Sherman Act, court decisions
under the Sherman Act are not binding precedent under the Clayton Act, and vice
versa.108
3. Application of Section 7 of the Clayton Act to Not-For-Profit Hospitals
Some scholars argue that section seven of the Clayton Act does not apply to notfor-profit hospitals, because under section eleven of the Clayton Act, the FTC lacks
jurisdiction to hear such cases.109 Conversely, courts determined that section seven
of the Clayton Act does apply to not-for-profit hospitals. Courts have held that
section eleven of the Clayton Act110 gives jurisdiction to the FTC to enforce the
provisions set forth in section seven of the Clayton Act over mergers and
acquisitions by nonprofit entities.111 Three other decisions rendered by federal courts
and decided after Philadelphia National Bank, scrutinize the issue of whether asset
acquisitions made by not-for-profit hospitals will “be subjected to a government
antitrust prosecution under the Clayton Act.”112

106

Treadway Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 389 F. Supp. 996 (D.N.J. 1974).

107

Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311
(1965).
108

United States v. Smith Pie Co., 440 F.Supp. 220 (E.D. Pa. 1976).

109

See Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. at 321; Adventist Health Sys. No. 9234, 1991
F.T.C. LEXIS 354, *1.
110

15 U.S.C. § 21 (2001). Section 11 of the Clayton Act states in relevant part;
“(a) Commission, Board, or Secretary authorized to enforce compliance. Authority to
enforce compliance with sections 2, 3, 7, and 8 of this Act [15 U.S.C.S. § 13, 14, 18,
19] by the persons respectively subject thereto is hereby vested in the Surface
Transportation Board where applicable to common carriers subject to jurisdiction
under subtitle IV of title 49, United States Code [49 U.S.C.S. § 10101 et seq.]; in the
Federal Communications Commission where applicable to common carriers engaged
in wire or radio communication or radio transmission of energy; in the Secretary of
Transportation where applicable to air carriers and foreign air carriers subject to the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 [49 U.S.C.S. Appx § 1301 et seq.]; in the Federal
Reserve Board [Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System] where applicable
to banks, banking associations, and trust companies; and in the Federal Trade
Commission where applicable to all other character of commerce to be exercised as
follows:” Id.
111

Adventist Health Sys., No. 9234, 1991 F.T.C. LEXIS 354, at *3.

112

Id. at *49 (discussing, F.T.C. v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 295 (1990); United States v. Carilion Health Sys., No. 89-2625, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS
2657).
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In the first of the three cases, FTC v. University Health, Inc.,113 the plaintiff,
FTC, sought a preliminary injunction from the court to prevent University Health,
Inc., a nonprofit corporation owning other nonprofit hospitals in the Augusta Georgia
area, from acquiring St. Joseph Hospital, also a nonprofit hospital.114 Even though
the court denied FTC’s request for a preliminary injunction, the court also denied a
motion to dismiss by the defendants, based on the nonprofit status of the hospitals.115
The FTC appealed the district court’s decision. Although there was no discussion of
the FTC’s jurisdiction over this matter, it would have been impossible for the court
to make a decision on the merits of such a case without first determining that the
FTC had jurisdiction under section seven of the Clayton Act, concerning the asset
acquisitions by nonprofit hospitals.116
In the second case, United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp.,117 the DOJ
attempted to prevent the merger of two nonprofit hospitals.118 The court held that the
merger was in violation of section seven of the Clayton Act, and the defendants
appealed, claiming that a merger of two nonprofit hospitals was outside the scope of
section seven of the Clayton Act.119 The court disagreed because Illinois law forbade
nonprofit corporations from having stock. The court refused to expand the broad
interpretation of this clause as it was used in the Philadelphia National Bank case.120
Judge Posner wrote for the court in Rockford Memorial Corp., in which he
provides a complete analysis of the application of section seven, generally to
nonprofit companies, but specifically to nonprofit hospitals.121 Posner suggests that
assuming that the language in section seven of the Clayton Act, which states,
“person[s] subject to the jurisdiction of the FTC,” refers to the FTC Act, disregards
the plausibility that the language in section seven may be referring to the language in
section eleven of the Clayton Act.122 Section eleven grants jurisdiction to five
agencies over specified violations of the enumerated section; in this list the FTC’s
jurisdiction appears to be a catchall for the items not listed.123

113

F.T.C. v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1991).

114

Adventist Health Sys., No. 9234, 1991 F.T.C. LEXIS 354, at *49 (discussing University
Health, Inc., 938 F.2d at 1206).
115

Id.

116

Id. at *49-50.

117

United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 295 (1990).
118

Adventist Health Sys., No. 9234, 1991 F.T.C. LEXIS 354, at *50.

119

Id.

120

Id. at *50-51. See generally Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. at 321.

121

In re Adventist Health Sys., 114 F.T.C. at 481.

122

Id. (quoting Rockford Mem’l Corp., 898 F.2d at 1280-81). See also 15 U.S.C. § 21
(2001).
123
In re Adventist Health Sys., 114 F.T.C. at 481 (quoting Rockford Mem’l Corp., 898 F.2d
at 1280-81).
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This section of the Clayton Act also describes the procedures these enforcing
bodies must follow.124 These procedures apply to the Clayton Act, absent any other
procedural Acts with regards to these agencies.125 Thus, when Congress, in 1950,
expanded section seven, it did the same with section eleven.126 Therefore, the asset
acquisitions that will be exempt from the jurisdiction of these agencies are those set
forth in section eleven, and not those exempted by any other procedural act
applicable to these agencies outside the Clayton Act.127 Applying this rationale,
hospital mergers are not exempt, because section eleven of the Clayton Act does not
state an exemption from the FTC’s jurisdiction for such mergers and acquisitions.128
Section eleven put limitations on the FTC’s jurisdictional reach, by stating that
jurisdiction lies with other agencies in regards to industries which these agencies
regulate. The statute makes no mention of nonprofit companies. Thus, the catchall
language of section eleven vests jurisdiction over these matters in the FTC.129
Although the court’s analysis of the application of section seven and eleven of
the Clayton Act in this case constitutes dicta, the analysis must still be given due
consideration by the FTC.130 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s
injunction. The court based its decision on an analysis under section one of the
Sherman Act.131
The third case discussing asset acquisition with not-for-profit hospitals is United
States v. Carilion Health System.132 In this case the DOJ brought an antitrust claim
under section one of the Sherman Act and under section seven of the Clayton Act, to
enjoin the consolidation of two nonprofit hospitals in Roanoke, Virginia.133 The
district court granted dismissal for the defendant, because it found that in an
acquisition of a nonprofit hospital there is no stock involved, and thus section seven
of the Clayton Act did not apply.134 The district court further held that the
acquisition clause of section seven did not apply, because the FTC did not have
jurisdiction over nonprofit entities.135 The district court did not state, in determining
the jurisdictional issue, why it used the FTC Act as opposed to section eleven of the
124

Id.

125

Id.

126

Id.

127

Id. See also AREEDA & TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW at 109 n.2 (1989 Supp.).

128

In re Adventist Health Sys., 114 F.T.C. at 481-82.

129

Id.

130

Id. at 482 (discussing Rockford Mem’l Corp., 898 F.2d at 1280-81).

131

Id. at *55-56 (discussing Rockford Mem’l Corp., 898 F.2d at 1278).

132

United States v. Carilion Health Sys., 707 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Va. 1989), aff'd mem.,
892 F.2d 1042 (4th Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
133

Adventist Health Sys., No. 9234, 1991 F.T.C. LEXIS 354, at *55-56, (discussing
Carilion Health Sys., 707 F. Supp. at 840).
134

Id. at *56 (discussing Carilion Health Sys., 707 F. Supp. at 840).

135

Id. See generally Carilion Health Sys., 707 F. Supp. at 840.
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Clayton Act.136 After the district court’s decision, the government appealed to the
Fourth Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s decision, and failed to address the
issue regarding section seven of the Clayton Act.137
III. THE GOVERNMENT’S PRIMA FACIE CASE
In a federal claim, the FTC typically seeks injunctive relief. This section
discusses the elements the government must prove to prevail on the merits of a
section seven claim. First, the FTC may establish its prima facie case by
demonstrating through statistical analysis, that the entity created through the
proposed merger would control an undue percentage of the relevant market, thus
causing an increase in that entity’s concentration of power over a particular product
and geographical market.138 In order for the FTC to be successful on a claim under
section seven of the Clayton Act, it must also illustrate that the proposed merger or
acquisition will realistically result in the significant lessening of competition in the
relevant market in the future.139
A. Definition of the Relevant Market
The described analysis determines whether an entity is attempting to monopolize
or impair competition, resulting in the control of an excessive proportion of the
relevant market.140 Determining exactly what constitutes the relevant market is
extraordinarily fact specific, and thus is a factual question to be determined by a
jury.141 The burden of proving the relevant market rests on the antitrust plaintiff,
including the DOJ and the FTC.142 As with any determination of fact by a jury, it
may only be overturned if that decision is found to be clearly erroneous.143 Once the
jury has made all of its factual determinations, and neither party disputes any of
those decisions, then the court may decide the remaining issue of the market
definition as a matter of law.144

136

Id. at *57.

137

Id. at *58.

138

F.T.C. v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1289 (W.D. Mich. 1996).

139

Id. (citing F.T.C. v. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 267 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Federal
Trade Comm'n v. Nat'l Tea Co., 603 F.2d 694, 698 (8th Cir. 1979))); Federal Trade Comm'n
v. University Health Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1218 (11th Cir. 1991).
140

BENDER, supra note 48, at § 24.01(4)(a).

141

Id.

142
Id. § 24.01(4)(b). See also E. I. Du Pont de Nemours and Co., 353 U.S. at 586;
International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 250 (1959); Spectrum Sports, Inc. v.
McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 455 (1993); White & White, Inc. v. American Hosp. Supply Corp.,
723 F.2d 495, 499-500 (6th Cir. 1983); Flegel v. Christian Hosp., Northeast-Northwest, 4 F.3d
683, 691 (8th Cir. 1993), reh,g denied.
143

Id.

144

Id.
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In defining the relevant market, the court seeks to identify other competitors that
the defendant’s target consumer could turn to in the event that the merged entity tried
to use its new market power to raise prices above competitive levels.145 Two aspects
define the relevant market: the product market and the geographic market.146 If the
relevant market has been properly defined it will not include potential suppliers who
provide a product or service that varies too greatly from that of the defendant (the
product market), or potential suppliers that are too far away from the defendant
(geographic market). Said supplier will also not change its practice to tender
defendant’s customers a comparable alternative to defendant’s product or service.147
1. Relevant Product Market
The first aspect of the relevant market is the relevant product market. Because
neither the Sherman Act nor the Clayton Act contains the necessary definition of
either market, courts determined the definition of the relevant market.148 In the two
vital decisions of Cellophane and Brown Shoe, the Supreme Court enunciated the
principles that controlled the definition of the relevant product market.149 Although
the Supreme Court determined how to define the relevant product market, that
definition was vague. This vague definition makes it difficult to determine the exact
reach of the court’s definition. Thus, there had to a means to define the outer limits
of such market.150 Three tests were adopted to define the boundaries of the
definition created by the Court: the “reasonable interchangeability of use,” the
“cross-elasticity of demand” test, and the “cluster test.”151
It is easier to understand the first two tests if discussed together. A cursory
glance at these two tests demonstrates their importance. The rub of the “reasonable
interchangeability” test is the physical characteristics and applications of the
product.152 Also, under this test, the product market will include products or services
that can be easily interchanged with the defendant’s product or service, taking into
consideration price, use, and quality.153 The “cross-elasticity of demand” test does
145

Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. at 1290 (citing United States v. Mercy Health
Services, 902 F Supp. 968, 975 (N.D. Iowa 1995)).
146

Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, at 1290 (citing Federal Trade Comm’n v.
Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, at 266-67 (8th Cir. 1995)).
147
Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. at 1290 (quoting United States v. Mercy Health
Services, 902 F Supp. 968, 975-76 (N.D. Iowa 1995)).
148

BENDER, supra note 48, at § 24.02 (citations omitted). See generally Brown Shoe Co.,
370 U.S. at 294 (stating that for the purposes of section 7 of the Clayton Act “line of
commerce” means the relevant product market, and “section of the country” is referring to the
geographic market).
149

Id.

150

See generally, BENDER, supra note 43, at § 24.02 (citations omitted).

151

Id.

152

BENDER, supra note 43, at § 24.02 (quoting E. I. Du Pont de Nemours and Co., 351 U.S.
at 404).
153

Id.
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not focus on the physical characteristics of the product, but rather focuses on the
price of the product, and how the sales of one product will change in response to a
variance in price of another product.154 Both tests determine what conditions will
force the consumer to choose one product over another.155 A high cross-elasticity of
demand shows that the products are in the same relevant product market. A low
cross-elasticity of demand demonstrates that the products are within different
product markets.156
The third and most relevant test is the “cluster test,” that presumes that a product
market can be composed of an assemblage or “cluster” of products or services
usually provided to the consumer as a group.157 The “cluster test” is typically used in
defining the product market involving the mergers of commercial banks and other
financial institutions. Lower courts broadened the scope of this test to include the
product market of acute-care inpatient hospital services when discussing the merger
of two or more such hospitals.158 These lower court cases demonstrate that this test
is best used when defining a product market that is comprised of a group of products
or services that are related to one another (not interchangeable, but complimentary to
one another), and where this group of products or services maintains a customer base
distinct from that of the products or services individually.159
2. Relevant Geographic Market
The other aspect of the relevant market is the geographic market. Section seven
of the Clayton Act prohibits any acquisition that could potentially lessen commerce
“in any section of the country.”160 Courts interpret this phrase to refer to the
geographic market.161 The Supreme Court defined the relevant geographic market to
be the area in which the providers of a particular product or service compete with
one another, and the area to which the consumers could potentially turn for an
alternative product or service as a result of a price increase.162 A proper
154

Id.

155

BENDER, supra note 43, at § 24.02 (citations omitted).

156

Id. at § 24.02(2)(e) (citations omitted).

157

Id. at § 24.02(3) (citing Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. at 321).

158

Id. at § 24.02(3) (citations omitted).

159

Id.

160

See generally 15 U.S.C. § 18(III)(A)(14) (2001) (citing Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at

294).
161

Id.

162

BENDER, supra note 48, at § 24.03 (citing United States v. Connecticut Nat’l Bank, 418
U.S. 656, 668 (1974) (relevant markets are where the merging party operates and to which the
bulk of its customers may turn for alternative services); United States v. Phillipsburg Nat’l
Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350, 363 (1970) (area of effective competition in the known line
of commerce must be charted by careful selection of the market area in which the seller
operates, and to which the purchaser can practicably turn for supplies); Tampa Elec. Co. v.
Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961) (area of effective competition in the known line
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determination of the relevant geographic market includes a necessary finding that
such market is consistent with the “commercial realities” of the trade, and that it
embodies an “economically significant” commerce area.163 Courts look to many
factors in determining the relevant geographic market, including transportation costs,
the entity’s history of entering into new areas, and where consumers might go in the
event of a price increase by the merged entity.164 With respect to the health care
industry, most courts define the geographic market to be the area where patients can
turn to other health care providers for acute-care inpatient services, in the event of a
merger or acquisition between hospitals resulting in a price increase in said care.165
a. Elzinga-Hogarty Two-Part Test
In determining the relevant geographic market, most courts use the two-part
Elzinga-Hogarty test,166 which utilizes expert testimony to determine the relevant
geographic market in a particular case.167 The first prong of the test, as used in cases
involving merging hospitals, requires a determination of the hospital’s “service
area:” the places from which the hospitals draw their patients.168 In order to
determine the service area, an expert witness examines the zip codes of discharged
patients released from the defendant’s hospitals.169 The expert organizes those zip
codes to create a preliminary map of the service area.170 If any other hospitals fall
within the preliminary map, the same process will be done with those hospitals to
create a complete service area map of all the hospitals.171

of commerce must be charted by careful selection of the market area in which the seller
operates, and to which the purchaser can practicably turn for supplies); Re/Max Int’l, Inc. v.
Realty One, Inc., 173 F.3d 995, 1016 (6th Cir. 1999) (geographic market is defined as an “area
of effective competition … such an area is not subject to definition by metes and bounds, it is
the locale in which consumers of a product or service can turn for alternative sources of
supply” (citations omitted)); White & White, Inc. v. American Hosp. Supply Corp., 723 F.2d
495, 501 (6th Cir. 1983) (“The central rubric in evaluating the relevant geographic market was
stated in Tampa Electric as follows: “[T]he area of effective competition in the known line of
commerce must be charted by careful selection of the market area in which the seller operates,
and to which the purchaser can practicably turn for supplies.”).
163

BENDER, supra note 43, at § 24.03(1) (citations omitted).
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Id.
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Alexander, supra note 2, at 88 (citing Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d at 268).
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Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d at 264. “A method devised by professors of economics
Kenneth G. Elzinga and Thomas F. Hogarty to analyze patterns of consumer origin and
destination and to identify relevant competitors of the merging entities.” Id.
167

Alexander, supra note 2 at 88 (citing Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d at 264).
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Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d at 264.
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Id. See also Alexander, supra note 2, at 88.
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Id.
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The second prong of the test requires the expert to determine where the patients
in the service area go for health care.172 The expert under this prong of the test, as
with the first prong, will use the zip code information of the patients to determine
what percentage of the people in the service area, determined above, utilized hospital
services in the established geographic area.173 In order for a relevant geographic
market to exist, seventy-five percent of the patients in the service area must use
hospitals within that area.174 A showing of seventy-five percent represents a weak
market, whereas ninety percent represents a strong market.175
3. Market Concentration
After defining the relevant market, the plaintiff must prove the market
concentration of the potential merged entity. In order for the FTC to establish its
prima facie case, it must demonstrate that the result of a proposed merger will be “a
significant increase in the concentration of power in the relevant markets and repose
in the merged entity an undue share of the markets.”176 The majority of courts rely
on the use of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to determine the market share
controlled by any particular entity.177 To calculate the HHI for a given market, the
percentage of the market share controlled by each competitor is squared, then the
resulting numbers are added together.178 Under the FTC Merger Guidelines,179 an
172

Id.

173

Alexander, supra note 2, at 88-89 (citing Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d at 265).

174

Alexander, supra note 2, at 89 (citing Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. at 1292).
See also Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. at 1292 (“Definition of the relevant
geographic market does not stop here however. In addition to historical patient flow data, the
Court must also consider evidence suggesting how consumers would respond to price
increases by the merged entity.”) (citing Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d at 268-69; United States v.
Mercy Health Services, 902 F. Supp. 968, 978 (N.D. Iowa 1995)).
175

Id.
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Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. at 1294 (citing University Health, 938 F.2d at

1218.)
177

Alexander, supra note 2, at 89.

178

Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. at 1294. The following is an example of the
application of the HHI. If there where six firms in a market with the following market shares
of, twenty-five percent, twenty percent, twenty percent, fifteen percent, ten percent, and ten
percent, the HHI would be equal to 1,850, represented numerically as (252 + 202 + 202 + 152 +
102 + 102 = 1,850). Therefore if the entity with the twenty-five percent market share merged
with one of the entities with the ten percent market share it would create a 500 point difference
between the pre and post-merger HHI. This creates a rebuttable presumption of market power
and the use thereof.
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BENDER, supra note 43, at § 70.05 (quoting U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION, STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE 1
§ A (1996), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) at 13, 153 and in ANTITRUST PRIMARY
SOURCE PAMPHLET). It must be noted that there are “safety zones” set forth by the Justice
Department and the FTC which protect mergers “‘between two general acute-care hospitals
where one of the hospitals (1) has an average of fewer than 100 licensed beds over the three
most recent years, (2) has an average daily inpatient census of fewer than 40 patients over the
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HHI, greater than 1,800 before the proposed merger represents a highly concentrated
market. Likewise, the FTC views a merger that will result in an HHI increase of 100
points or more as likely to create or augment market power or aid its exercise.180
In Federal Trade Commission v. Butterworth Health Corporation,181 the court
applied the HHI index and accepted the expert’s testimony that Butterworth and
Blodgett, two hospitals proposing a merger, controlled over forty-seven to sixty-five
percent of the relevant market, defined as “general acute-care inpatient hospital
services in greater Kent County[Michigan].”182 The estimated HHI for this market,
post-merger, was within the range of 2,767 to 4,521, which demonstrated a potential
increase of between 1,064 and 1,889 points.183 The expert also determined, as to the
“primary care inpatient hospital market,” that the proposed merged entity would
control sixty-five to seventy percent of that market.184 If the proposed merger was
not enjoined, the HHI for the “primary care inpatient hospital market” would
increase to between 4,506 and 5,079, representing an increase of 1,675 to 2,001
points.185 Based on this evidence, the expert predicted that the result of the proposed
merger would be a highly concentrated market. Thus, “the FTC established its prima
facie case that the proposed merger would violate section seven of the Clayton
Act.”186
The establishment of the FTC’s prima facie case creates a rebuttable presumption
of illegality.187 The burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption of a
section seven Clayton Act violation.188 At this point, the court considers any
evidence by the defendant of ease of entry into the market for new competitors.189 If
the defendant successfully provides the necessary evidence to invalidate the
presumption, then the burden of proof shifts back to the FTC.190
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IV. CLEVELAND CLINIC HEALTH SYSTEM (CCHS) AND ITS SUBSIDIARIES
The Cleveland Clinic Health System opened its doors in 1997.191 CCHS is a
non-profit organization located in Cleveland, Ohio, with annual revenue in excess of
$2.2 billion.192 CCHS owns and operates numerous hospitals in the greater
Cleveland area, including Euclid Hospital, Fairview Hospital, Hillcrest Hospital,
Huron Hospital, Lakewood Hospital, Lutheran Hospital, Marymount Hospital, South
Pointe Hospital, Cleveland Clinic Children’s Hospital for Rehabilitation, and The
Cleveland Clinic.193
A. CCHS Affiliates
The Cleveland Clinic (The Clinic) is a 954 bed hospital, located on Euclid
Avenue in Cleveland, Ohio. Founded in 1921, the Clinic began as a private,
nonprofit organization, which incorporates clinical and hospital care with education
and research.194 Annually, the Cleveland Clinic has more than 1.2 million outpatient
visits, and also has over 50,000 inpatient admissions from all over the United States
and from more than eighty countries, generating over $2.3 billion in revenue from
patient care alone.195 The Clinic has received a great deal of recognition from U.S.
News & World Report and has been named one of the top six hospitals in the
country for the past eleven years.196 The Clinic is also the only hospital in Ohio to be
named one of the “Best Hospitals in America,” according to the magazine.197 In
addition to the main hospital campus near downtown Cleveland, the Clinic has
family health centers and surgery centers located throughout Cleveland’s
surrounding suburbs.198
The Clinic has a laundry list of specialty areas that it provides, including: cancer,
cardiology, colorectal surgery, dentistry, dermatology, emergency medicine,
endocrinology, gastroenterology, general surgery, gynecology and obstetrics,
hematology and medical oncology, infectious disease, nephrology and hypertension,
neurology and neurological surgery, ophthalmology, orthopaedic surgery,
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otolaryngology, pediatrics and all pediatric sub-specialties, plastic and reconstructive
surgery, pulmonology, radiation oncology, radiology, rehabilitation, rheumatic and
immunologic disease, thoracic and cardiovascular surgery, transplantation, urology,
vascular medicine and vascular surgery.199 Taking into account the number of
staffed beds and the numerous specialty areas that the Clinic provides, the Clinic
ranks as the largest hospital in Cleveland.200
In 1998, the Cleveland Clinic Health System added the Cleveland Clinic
Children’s Hospital for Rehabilitation, formally named Health Hill Hospital. In
September of 1999, the hospital changed its name to its current designation.201 The
Cleveland Clinic Children’s Hospital for Rehabilitation is a fifty-two bed, non-profit
organization and “the region’s premier provider of comprehensive pediatric, medical
and rehabilitative services for children with chronic illnesses and disabilities
(including those caused by trauma; birth defects, brain and spinal cord injury; and
respiratory, orthopaedic, neuromuscular and developmental disorders).”202 The
Children’s Hospital is one of the few hospitals in the United States that provide
accredited pediatric services.203
Euclid Hospital, originally named Glenville Hospital, was established in 1907,
and built at its current location in 1952.204 Now a member of CCHS, Euclid Hospital
houses 371 licensed beds.205 This hospital offers a number of medical services
including: emergency services, surgery, acute-care, sub-acute-care, rehabilitation,
and outpatient care.206
Fairview Hospital, an acute-care hospital located in Westlake, Ohio contains 469
licensed beds. Significantly, Fairview has been a part of the Cleveland community
for over 100 years.207 Only recently did Fairview become part of CCHS.208
Fairview Hospital includes an Emergency department that also provides a Level II
trauma center and a FastER Care program. The FastER program provides services to
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patients with less severe injuries and ailments.209 Fairview Hospital also maintains a
hospital-based surgery center, and a top-of-the-line outpatient surgery center.210
Every year this hospital provides inpatient, outpatient, and emergency care to well
over 300,000 patients.211
Hillcrest Hospital began in 1968 as a nonprofit organization in Mayfield Heights,
Ohio. Hillcrest maintains 347 full-service staffed beds.212 Hillcrest offers a great
deal of health care services, which include: “laser and outpatient surgery, a maternity
center, a Neonatal Intensive Care [unit], a pediatrics unit, an invitro fertilization
program, a Women’s Resource Center, and digestive health centers, state-of-the-art
radiology services, a Level II trauma center, comprehensive cardiovascular services
(open heart surgery, intensive care and coronary care units), and a cancer center.”213
According to a survey done by HCIA, a leading company in providing information
on the health care industry, during the last four out of five years, Hillcrest was named
one the country’s top 100 hospitals.214
Huron Hospital, established in 1874 and located on the former Rockefeller estate,
is an acute-care teaching hospital with 211 licensed beds.215 Huron Hospital
practices in a number of specialty areas including: “Behavioral Health Services,
including inpatient and outpatient mental health, chemical dependency and
detoxification services, and Diabetes Education and Management,” which provide
expert health care services to the community.216 Huron bears the distinction of being
the only eastside hospital that provides hospital-based 9-1-1 emergency services.217
It also has a well-trained Emergency Medical Service (EMS) crew that responds to
the emergency calls of East Cleveland and Bratenahl, transporting those patients to
the hospital’s Level II Trauma Center.218 As a Level II Trauma Center, Huron
hospital may treat the most severe life and limb-threatening injuries.219
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Lakewood Hospital, a 400-bed acute-care hospital, was founded in 1907.220
Located on the Westside of Cleveland, Lakewood practices in a number of specialty
areas, including: “Behavioral medicine, accredited diabetes education and
management, emergency services, Level II trauma center, geriatric medicine, home
care, maternal and child health, orthopedics, rehabilitation services, skilled nursing
facility, surgical specialties.”221 As a member of CCHS, Lakewood prides itself on
being a community-based hospital providing the highest quality of care to the
Westside of Cleveland.222
Lutheran Hospital was established in 1896 and serves downtown Cleveland, Ohio
City, and Cleveland’s Westside.223 Lutheran is a 219-bed, acute-care hospital
providing a large array of primary health care, including; “Adult and geriatric
behavioral health, primary care services, emergency medicine, orthopedic and spine
care, pain management, physical and occupational therapy, rehabilitation services,
sports medicine, urology.”224 Lutheran has just recently become a member of
CCHS.225
Founded in 1949 by the Sisters of Saint Joseph, TOSF, Marymount Hospital is a
nonprofit Catholic hospital, providing acute-care services to Southern and
Southeastern Cuyahoga County and the adjacent neighborhoods.226 Through the
years, Marymount continued to grow and expand, allowing it to become a member of
CCHS.227 Marymount currently offers “ambulatory and minimally invasive surgery,
behavioral and occupational health, women’s services including mammography,
obstetrics and gynecology, diagnostic cardiac catheterization, CT and MRI Imaging
including a Regional Radiology Center, sports medicine and rehab, [and]
endoscopy,” along with numerous other programs to provide top-of-the-line health
care in the Southern Cuyahoga County area.228
South Pointe Hospital, created in 1994 with the merger of Brentwood and
Meridia Suburban hospitals, is a teaching hospital, affiliated with Ohio University
College of Osteopathic Medicine. South Pointe contains 223 licensed beds.229 This
hospital provides a wide range of medical and surgical services to the area including:
“cancer care, cardiac care, coronary/intensive care, emergency medicine,
220
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rehabilitation and surgery.”230 South Pointe is currently expanding its facilities, with
a projected completion date of 2003.231 The construction project is estimated to cost
$30 million.232
B. Major Competitors
CCHS competes with two major health systems in northeast Ohio. The first
competitor is University Hospitals Health System (UHHS). Located in northeast
Ohio, UHHS facilitates eleven hospitals: University Hospitals of Cleveland, which
also consists of the Alfred and Norma Lerner Tower, Lakeside Hospital, Samuel
Mather Pavilion, MacDonald Women’s Hospital, Rainbow Babies & Children’s
Hospital, Ireland Cancer Center, Psychiatric Center at Hanna Pavilion; UHHS
Bedford Medical Center, UHHS Brown Memorial Hospital, UHHS Geauga Regional
Hospital, UHHS Memorial Hospital of Geneva, UHHS Laurelwood Hospital,
Southwest General Health Center, Mercy Medical Center, St. John West Shore
Hospital, St. Vincent Charity Hospital, Saint Luke's Emergency Center, are also
affiliated with UHHS.233 Similar to CCHS, UHHS provides a wide range of health
care services to the community through the partnering of local area hospitals.234
The second major CCHS competitor is Metro Health System (MHS). MHS
opened in 1837 as City Hospital.235 MHS is also one of the leading health care
providers in northeast Ohio.236 MHS consists of: MetroHealth Medical Center,
MetroHealth West Park Medical, Building, MetroHealth Asia Plaza Health, Care
Clinic, MetroHealth Southwest Medical Group, and MetroHealth Brooklyn Medical
Group.237 Similar to its two competitors, MHS provides an extensive array of health
care services to the community, but differs from the other two in that one of its listed
goals is to control the cost of health care.238 These three major health care providers
in northeast Ohio compete for control over the product market discussed herein.
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C. Recent Developments
Some of the most recent activity by CCHS occurred in May 2000, when
Bankruptcy Judge Mary F. Walrath approved CCHS’ bid of $52.65 million to
purchase the Integrated Medical Campus in Beachwood, Ohio, which was formerly
part of, now bankrupt, Primary Health Systems (PHS).239 Prior to this order by the
court, CCHS attempted to purchase the Integrated Medical Campus in Beachwood,
St. Michael Hospital in Slavic Village, and Mt. Sinai Medical Center East in
Richmond Heights for $62 million.240 Although providing no evidence of bad-faith
on the part of CCHS, the Bankruptcy court supplied numerous instances where PHS
was less than honest.241 PHS was given a thirty-day timeframe during which it could
seek bids for the three entities (St. Michaels Hospital located in Slavic Village; Mt.
Sinai Medical Center East situated in Richmond Heights; and the Integrated Medical
Campus in Beachwood).242 Despite the fact that the end result here appeared to
benefit all involved, including the community, the negotiations between CCHS and
PHS had a high potential to end with an anticompetitive outcome.
V. ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION OF CURRENT LAW TO A POTENTIAL ACQUISITION BY
CCHS OF ANOTHER LOCAL AREA HOSPITAL
This analysis assumes that the FTC has jurisdiction over a nonprofit organization.
This assumption is based on the relevant case law, and language set forth in Section
eleven of the Clayton Act. If the FTC sought a preliminary injunction against an
acquisition proposed by CCHS to acquire another acute-care facility, the court would
have to determine the likelihood of the FTC’s ultimate success on the merits.
Specifically, the FTC would be required to demonstrate that the proposed merger
would result in the substantial lessening of competition in the relevant market in the
future.243 Initially, the burden of proof rests on the FTC.244 The FTC must prove
that following the merger, CCHS would control an undue share of the Cleveland
area’s relative market, including both the product and geographic markets.
The background information previously discussed on the hospitals owned by
CCHS, would permit the FTC to define two relative product markets. The first
product market would be the market for “general acute-care inpatient hospital
services.” The FTC defines this market as a general accumulation of diverse
services and qualifications that are essential to provide the necessary medical and
surgical needs, as well as other services required by inpatients, e.g., anesthesia,
intensive care capabilities, lodging, operating rooms, pharmaceuticals, and 24-hour
239
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nursing care.245 With the application of the cluster test, these services and
capabilities must be viewed as a group which the consumer would not be able to find
a reasonable substitute for outside of a general acute-care hospital.246
The second market that the FTC would recognize is “primary-care inpatient
hospital services.”247 The FTC defines primary-care services to consist of basic or
standard inpatient hospital services offered at a majority of general acute-care
hospitals, for example, normal childbirth, general medicine and general surgery.248
Because courts have recognized these markets in the past as suitable product markets
for mergers within the health care industry, this aspect of the relative market will not
be that difficult for the FTC to prove.249
The geographic market, on the other hand, requires a much more complex
analysis in order to determine how far such a market reaches. The FTC, through
expert testimony, would want to define the geographic market as narrowly as
possible, giving CCHS control over a larger market share. On the contrary, CCHS
would want to define the geographic market as broadly as possible.250 Even though
the Elzinga-Hogarty test is the primary test used to determine the area defined as the
geographic market, plaintiff’s expert and the defendant’s expert, as well the court, all
may interpret the information differently.251 If the court accepts CCHS’ expert
testimony broadly defining the geographic market, this will not preclude the FTC
from ultimately succeeding on the merits, but will result in an increased burden on
the FTC to prove undue market control by the defendant. If the court is willing to
accept the FTC’s expert testimony however, which narrowly defines the relevant
geographic market, this eases the burden on the FTC to prove control over a
disproportionate market share. The acceptance of either testimony results in the
completion of the definition of the relevant market.
After adequately defining the relevant market, the FTC would then need to prove
that the proposed acquisition would result in an increase in the concentration of
power in the above-defined markets, giving CCHS excessive control over the
market.252 Next, an analysis of the relevant market concentration will be necessary.
If for example, there are four competitors in the geographic market as defined above,
each having an equal market share, this would translate into twenty-five percent for
CCHS, twenty-five percent for University Hospital Health System (UHHS, twentyfive percent for Metro Health System (MHS), and twenty-five percent for the
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potential unnamed fourth. Applying the HHI, the resulting number is 2500.253 This
result constitutes a concentrated market; any merger or acquisition within this market
with an increase in the HHI by more than 100 points would raise a red flag for
potential anticompetitive activities. Further, assuming that CCHS acquires one of
the competitors, resulting in control of fifty percent of the relative product market,
the resulting HHI would be 3,750, an increase of 1,250 points, which is a substantial
increase in market power.
This result would suffice to show excessive
concentration.
Although the numbers set forth are strictly hypothetical, a March 2000 article
established that prior to the purchase of Integrated Medical Campus in Beachwood,
CCHS controlled sixty-two percent of the market share for hospital beds in the
Cleveland area.254 Assuming that the percentage of CCHS market control has not
changed as of today, this would leave thirty-eight percent to be divided among
competitors in the geographic market. CCHS’ two biggest competitors in the
geographic market are UHHS and MHS. Based on the amount of the market that
CCHS controls, this allows for the assumption that these two health systems together
control a substantial amount of the remaining thirty-eight percent.255 Therefore, even
if CCHS were to acquire another one percent of the market it would result in an
increase of the HHI of over 100 points. The courts would view any such acquisition
by CCHS as “likely to create or enhance market power or facilitate its exercise.”256
Based on this HHI analysis, and assuming that the relevant market is proven, a court
would likely conclude that the FTC satisfied its prima facie case. Again, once the
FTC establishes its prima facie case, it creates a rebuttable presumption of
illegality.257 The burden then shifts to the defendant to provide evidence that
undercuts the extrapolative worth of the FTC’s facts.258 If the defendant succeeds in
providing the necessary evidence to invalidate the presumption, then the burden of
proof shifts back to the FTC.259
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A. Defenses
CCHS may raise two potential defenses to shield it merger actions. The first
defense, termed the “failing company doctrine” states that the acquisition of stock of
another company in failing conditions will be permissible if the defendant can prove
the following: that recovery is improbable, that the acquisition is not detrimental to
community, and that the acquisition does not significantly diminish competition or
restrain commerce within objectives of section seven of the Clayton Act.260 The
failing firm defense may be invoked if the defendant can prove that a corporation's
capital and assets are so exhausted and the possibility of revitalization is so bleak
that the company faces “grave probability of business failure.”261
To employ this defense, the defendant must also show that without the merger or
acquisition there is potential harm to the stockholders of the “failing” company and
the community, and that defendant, as a competitor, is the only potential buyer
available.262 Also, the defendant must demonstrate that the purpose of the merger or
acquisition is not to impair or lessen competition, but is consummated to assist the
defendant’s accrued business and to prevent harm to the public with the loss of a
resource, without lessening competition or restraining commerce.263 Based on the
description set forth above, CCHS would have a great deal of difficulty proving that
the acquisition of as little as one percent of the market is for any of the purposes set
forth above.
The second defense CCHS may utilize is the “efficiencies” defense. Assuming
the FTC proves it prima facie case, then CCHS’ acquisition of one percent of the
market substantially lessens competition. Therefore, CCHS must prove that the
consequences of the proposed merger have considerable economic effects that help
competition, and thus the consumer.264 Operating cost reductions and elimination of
duplicative equipment and departments are examples of economic efficiencies that
may lower costs to consumers.265 Extensive research however, indicates no
documentation of any such activity by CCHS. Therefore, unless CCHS were to
show that the results of a proposed merger or acquisition were to enhance
competition and help consumers, then the merger or acquisition should be
permanently enjoined.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article first describes the origin and scope of the Sherman Antitrust Act and
the Clayton Antitrust Act. Then it discusses the application of these Acts to different
industries, most specifically the health care industry. Following that, this article
establishes the FTC’s jurisdiction over mergers of nonprofit companies. Finally, this
260

15 U.S.C. § 18 (citing International Shoe Co. v. F.T.C., 280 U.S. 291 (1930)).

261

Id. at 302.

262

Id.

263

Id.

264

Id.

265
See Alexander, supra note 2, at 98-99. See also Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F.
Supp. at 1300; Carilion Health System, 707 F. Supp. at 840.

168

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 17:137

analysis is applied to a possible merger between CCHS and another competitor
within the geographic market established above.
Through this analysis, it appears that it would not be inordinately difficult for the
FTC to establish a prima facie case against CCHS. A genuine concern may arise
with CCHS’ potential defenses. If the Bankruptcy Court had allowed CCHS to
acquire all of PHS’ assets, such an acquisition would certainly have given rise to
numerous antitrust issues. The real FTC problem in this instance would not have
been establishing proof of CCHS’ undue control over the market, but rather rebutting
CCHS’ defense that PHS was a failing firm. By raising a “failing firm” defense,
CCHS could be deemed to be helping to maintain, as opposed to hindering, a
competitive market.
Another possible CCHS defense is a cost-efficiency defense, whereby CCHS
could claim, and would ultimately have to prove, that the acquisition eliminated
duplications in service, and thus reduced the costs to consumers. Although the
burden of persuasion ultimately rest on the FTC, it will still be the responsibility of
CCHS to prove that its actions where not anticompetitive in nature. In closing, it
would behoove the FTC to keep a close watch on future CCHS activities.
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